Partnership Dissolution : Information and Efficiency

This paper analyses the efficiency of the Texas shootout and ½-auction partnership dissolution mechanisms when one of the partners has a chance to observe the other partner's valuation. The efficiency of the Texas shootout mechanism positively depends on the probability of such observation while for ½-auction mechanism such relationship is not monotonic: the outcome is efficient when the probability of observing the other partner's signal is either zero or one, but it is inefficient for all intermediate values

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Khoroshilov, Yuri
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Partnerschaftsgesellschaft \| Professional partnership

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Y. Khoroshilov (2006). Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency. Decision Analysis, 15(3) Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 9, 2017 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2930455 [DOI]
Classification:	G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; D44 - Auctions ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934500