Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive forSequential Innovation
Year of publication: |
2006-04-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Moschini, Giancarlo ; Yerokhin, Oleg |
Institutions: | Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, Iowa> / Department of Economics |
Subject: | Innovation | Spieltheorie | game theory | Patent | Property-Rights-Ansatz | Intellectual Property Rights protection | Markov-Entscheidungsprozess | Markov |
Extent: | 425984 bytes 42 p. application/pdf |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L00 - Industrial Organization. General ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues ; Specific management methods ; Market research ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
-
Innovation, Duplication, and the Contract Theory of Patents
Franzoni, Luigi A., (2013)
-
Appropriability and the Timing of Innovation : Evidence from Mit Inventions
Dechenaux, Emmanuel, (2015)
-
The US Patent Holdings of Homegrown Indian Biotech and Pharma Companies
Sundaramoorthy, Sriramkumar, (2016)
- More ...
-
Patents, research exemption, and the incentive for sequential innovation
Moschini, Giancarlo, (2008)
-
Intellectual property rights and crop-improving R&D under adaptive destruction
Yerokhin, Oleg, (2008)
-
Patents, research exemption, and the incentive for sequential innovation
Moschini, Giancarlo, (2006)
- More ...