Performance Pay, Group Selection andGroup Performance

Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may,first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose workeffort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for bothtasks as offered by the principal...

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Year of publication:	2007-03-01
Authors:	Königstein, Manfred ; Ruchala, Gabriele K.
Institutions:	Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn>
Subject:	Experiment \| Experiments \| Arbeitsgruppe

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Extent:	249856 bytes 33 p. application/pdf
Series:	IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Discussion Papers IZA Discussion Paper ; No. 2697 (2007)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C9 - Design of Experiments ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; Ergonomic job analysis ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863219