Persistent ideologies in an evolutionary setting

We analyse finite two player games in which agents maximize given arbitrary private payoffs which we call ideologies. We define an equilibrium concept and prove existence. Based on this setup, a monotone evolutionary dynamic governs the distribution of ideologies within the population. For any finite 2 player normal form game we show that there is an open set of ideologies being not equivalent to the objective payoffs that is not selected against by evolutionary monotonic dynamics. If the game has a strict equilibrium set, we show stability of non-equivalent ideologies. We illustrate these results for generic 2 × 2-games.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Koch, Lars P.
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Theorie \| Dynamic stability \| Evolution of preferences \| Imitation dynamics

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Series:	Working Papers ; 402
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	584638396 [GVK] hdl:10419/43758 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272545