Piracy and competition

The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and reduces total surplus.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Belleflamme, Paul ; Picard, Pierre M.
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Digitale Güter \| Produktpiraterie \| Computerkriminalität \| Betriebliche Preispolitik \| Produktdifferenzierung \| Duopol \| Wettbewerb \| Theorie \| information goods \| piracy \| copyright \| pricing

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 1350
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	47741379X [GVK] hdl:10419/18713 [Handle]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; L82 - Entertainment; Media (Performing Arts, Visual Arts, Broadcasting, Publishing, etc.) ; K11 - Property Law ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Source:	EconStor