Playing Hardball: Relationship Banking in the Age of Credit Derivatives

This paper develops a contracting framework in order to explore the effects of credit derivatives on banks incentives to monitor loans, their incentives to intervene, and, ultimately, borrowers incentives to perform.

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Year of publication:	2002-05-01
Authors:	Arping, Stefan
Publisher:	International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME)
Subject:	Bank \| Anreiz \| Kontrakttheorie \| Analyse

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Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
2. The model
3. Incentives to intervene
4. Incentives to monitor
5. Discussion and conclusions
6. References

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005843338