Political mergers as coalition formation : an analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations

Eric Weese

Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers. -- Boundaries ; Mergers ; Moment Inequalities ; Municipalities

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Weese, Eric
Publisher:	New Haven, Conn. : Yale Univ., Economic Growth Center [u.a.]
Subject:	Fusion \| Merger \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	Online Ressource (58 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion papers. - New Haven, Conn. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2195106-8. - Vol. 1022 Yale Economics Department working papers. - New Haven, Conn., ZDB-ID 2724193-2. - Vol. 113
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/98208 [Handle]
Classification:	C63 - Computational Techniques ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733296