Political parties and network formation

We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anti-corruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining access to politicians and, thereby, to become potential candidates for nominations. Such rent-seeking results in excessive network formation. Political parties may reduce wasteful network formation, thanks to their ability to enter into exclusive membership contracts. This holds even though anti-corruption laws also bind political parties.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Miettinen, Topi ; Poutvaara, Panu
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Patronage \| Rent Seeking \| Politische Partei \| Klubtheorie \| Theorie \| political parties \| two-sided platforms \| network formation

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Series:	IZA Discussion Papers ; 1918
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	506211630 [GVK] hdl:10419/33550 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D85 - Network Formation ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267614