Private institutions in waste management policy and their antitrust implications : the case of Germany's dual management system

The paper reconsiders arguments raised from the viewpoint of competition policy against Germany’s centralized Dual Management System for Packaging Waste Collection and Recycling. It is argued that centralization is the result of a basic principle of German waste management policy, namely, the so-called taking-back obligation. Specific features of the system’s governance structure are then shown to mitigate anticompetitive effects stemming from centralization, and to improve management performance. Furthermore, other features identified in the debate as hampering competition are argued as having an economic rationale from the viewpoint of the neoinstitutional theory of the firm. However, it is also argued that the above basic principle is not a precondition to reach policy targets. Hence, despite the above positive findings, the ultimate judgement with respect to this centralized, private structure is mixed.