Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mailath, George ; Matthews, Steven ; Sekiguchi, Tadashi |
Published in: |
Contributions to Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 2.2002, 1, p. 1046-1046
|
Publisher: |
Berkeley Electronic Press |
Subject: | Private strategies | repeated games | public perfect equilibria |
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