Profit Sharing Regulation: An Economic Appraisal
The stock market, take-over bidders, executive pay setters, perhaps Stephen Littlechild himself, even last summer's weather, all seem to have been undermining RPI-X price-cap regulation. Until recently, price-cap regulation was regarded as demonstrably superior to US-style rate-of-return regulation, and regulatory reform in several countries has embraced price-cap regulation. But in Britain, where price-cap regulation originated, the case now appears to be less compelling: price-cap regulation is perceived by some as conferring unwarranted profits on the utilities and imposing unsustainable demands on regulators. As a consequence, many people believe that we are slipping inexorably into some form of profit regulation.
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|Authors:||Mayer, Colin ; Vickers, John|
|Type of publication:||Article|
Mayer, Colin and Vickers, John (1996) Profit Sharing Regulation: An Economic Appraisal. Fiscal Studies, 17 (1). pp. 1-18.