Property rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model

The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Weikard, Hans-Peter
Publisher:	Potsdam : Universität Potsdam, Lehrstuhl Finanzwissenschaft

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Series:	Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; 17
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	52194869X [GVK] hdl:10419/30781 [Handle]
Classification:	D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270791