Protectionist Reputations and the Threat of Voluntary Export Restraint.
Voluntary export restraints are often administered in such a way that each firm's post-VER output allocation is positively related to its output under free trade. When this is true, a credible threat of a future VER will induce foreign firms to dump in the current period, decreasing the domestic price (the Yano effect), and possibly increasing welfare. We show that if an importing government's preferences are private information and if the government makes a series of VER decisions, there may exist an incentive for a welfare-maximizing government that normally prefers free trade to maintain a protectionist reputation by imposing a VER. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Jans, Ivette ; Wall, Howard J ; Hariharan, Govind |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 3.1995, 2, p. 199-208
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
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