Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale

We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome.

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Year of publication:	2009-05
Authors:	Ben Youssef, Slim ; Dinar, Zeineb

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English ; French
Notes:	Ben Youssef, Slim and Dinar, Zeineb (2009): Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale.
Classification:	H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; D62 - Externalities ; O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015221362