R&D and CEO departure date : do financial incentives make CEOs more opportunistic?
Year of publication: |
October 2017
|
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Authors: | Driver, Ciaran F. ; Guedes, Maria João |
Published in: |
Industrial and corporate change. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0960-6491, ZDB-ID 1112650-4. - Vol. 26.2017, 5, p. 801-820
|
Subject: | England | Opportunismus | Opportunism | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Aktienoption | Stock option | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Industrie | Manufacturing industries | Dienstleistungssektor | Service industry |
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