Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems

This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study the assortativeness of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents' rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Jaramillo, Paula
Other Persons:	Kayi, Cagatay (contributor) ; Klijn, Flip (contributor)
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Matching \| Theorie \| Theory \| Schüler \| Pupils \| Lebensgemeinschaft \| Cohabitation \| Core

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Series:	Documento CEDE ; No. 2017-36
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 13, 2017 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2974123 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012955594