Rankings games

Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the taste for science by a taste for publication. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Frey, Bruno S. ; Osterloh, Margit
Publisher:	Zurich : University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Subject:	Ranking-Verfahren \| Kritik \| Leistungsmotivation \| Sozialisation \| Hochschulforschung \| academic governance \| rankings \| motivation \| selection \| socialization

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Series:	Working Paper ; 39
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5167/uzh-51543 [DOI] 745459587 [GVK] hdl:10419/77584 [Handle]
Classification:	A10 - General Economics. General ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; H83 - Public Administration ; L23 - Organization of Production ; M50 - Personnel Economics. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316925