Rational Inefficiencies

In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Bogetoft, Peter ; Hougaard, Jens
Published in:	Journal of Productivity Analysis. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2003, 3, p. 243-271
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	efficiency \| preferences \| incentives \| bargaining \| planning

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010866029