Reciprocal Reactions to (In)transparent Task Assignments : An Experimental Investigation

We investigate how the transparency of selecting an agent for a task affects the agent's reciprocal behavior. In a laboratory experiment, we conduct a gift-exchange game with a random move representing the chance that a selected agent may not be available. We vary the transparency of the principal's selection, i.e., agents either receive information about having (not) been selected or receive no such information at all. The design allows to analyze the reciprocal response of agents who were not the preferred choice of the principal. We find that transparency of selection decisions induces opposing gender-specific reactions to the information of having (not) been selected. While men's behavior is in line with intention-based reciprocity, women's behavior is not. Behavior of both, men and women can be explained by gender-specific attribution styles of successes and failures (i.e., of having been selected or not). Our results imply that when hiring either a male employee who was the first choice or a female employee who was not the first choice, it might be a good idea to inform them about these facts to induce higher reciprocity