Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

We prove the existence of a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess pure-strategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a strategically stable set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; McLean, Richard P.
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 9.2014, 3, p. 555-582
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Discontinuous game \| potential game \| trembling-hand perfect equilibrium \| stable set \| essential equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1178 [DOI] 893658782 [GVK] hdl:10419/150231 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1178 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599522