Relative Injustice Aversion

I propose a new utility function based on the relative aversion to injustice to explain why, in classical bargaining games, classical equilibria do not hold when money is not windfall, but it is result of the effort.

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Year of publication:	2013-08-02
Authors:	Moreno-Garrido, Luis José Blas
Institutions:	Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	Distribution \| Equity \| Justice \| Altruism \| Property Rights

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	QM&ET Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series QM&ET Working Papers The price is shipping costs Number 13-4 27 pages
Classification:	D30 - Distribution. General ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D64 - Altruism ; P14 - Property Rights
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010991658