Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation : A Talent-Retention Explanation

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts and document features that are consistent with retention motives. Second, using a novel empirical specification for detecting RPE, we find RPE is less prevalent when CEO talent is less transferrable: among specialist CEOs, founder CEOs, and retirement-age CEOs, as well as in industries and states where the market for CEO talent is more restrictive

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	De Angelis, David
Other Persons:	Grinstein, Yaniv (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (43 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 28, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2432473 [DOI]
Classification:	G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904916