Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

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Year of publication:	2006-06
Authors:	Chouinard, Hayley
Institutions:	School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
Subject:	repeated auction \| right of first refusal \| asymmetric information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2006-6 19 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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