Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective.

In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Mailath, G.J. ; Morris, S.
Institutions:	Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| COORDINATION MECHANISMS \| NASH EQUILIBRIUM

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Series:	Australian National University - Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	27 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005663652