Repeated Nash implementation

Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We de?ne dynamic mono- tonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost suf?cient for repeated Nash implementation, regard less of whether the horizon is ?nite or in?nite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.”

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Year of publication:	January 2017
Authors:	Mezzetti, Claudio ; Renou, Ludovic
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 1, p. 249-285
Subject:	Dynamic monotonicity \| Nash implementation \| Maskin monotonicity \| repeated implementation \| repeated games \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Theorie \| Theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1988 [DOI] hdl:10419/197189 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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