Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.

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Year of publication:	2013-06-27
Authors:	Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Subject:	commitment \| incomplete information \| reputation bound \| reputation effects \| long-run relationships \| reputations

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	PIER Working Paper Archive.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	86 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685964