Risk, Growth and Social networks

This dissertation is an empirical investigation on the microeconomics of growth, focusing on the role of shocks and on the formation of credit networks. It uses original data, collected in Southern Ethiopia, an environment where nonlinear wealth dynamics that are at the root of persistent poverty were previously identified.The first chapter briefly places this work in the wider context of the development economics literature. The second chapter explores the causal mechanismsbehind the nonlinearities identified in earlier work. It focus on the role that notonly climatic shocks but also ability play in shaping different accumulation patterns. It is found that herders of low ability are expected to converge to a uniquedynamic equilibrium at a small herd size, while those with higher ability exhibitmultiple stable dynamic wealth equilibria.The third chapter of this dissertation validates a new approach to the collectionof data on social relations that starts with a random sample of individuals and thenrandomly samples from the prospective relationships among sample respondents.Using original data from southern Ethiopia it is shown that this method yieldsestimates of the structure of social relations that are statistically indistinguishable from those generated by tracing respondents' local networks. Through the use of Monte Carlo simulation, it is also shown that introducing this second level of sampling improves the accuracy of the inference on the determinants of network formation.The last chapter explores the effect of herd dynamics on the formation of creditnetworks. It finds that the threshold at which wealth dynamics bifurcate servesas a focal point at which credit transfers are concentrated and that asset loansrespond to recipients' losses as long as the recipients are not "too poor". Theseresults suggest that, when shocks can have long term effects, asset transfers mayaim to insure the permanent component of income generation, rather than thetransitory component, as it is commonly assumed. The chapter also shows thatthe persistently poor are less likely to be known within their communities and lesslikely to receive transfers in response to shocks.