Sabotage in teams

We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal’s contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member’s bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias ; Müller, Daniel
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 2, p. 289-292
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Moral hazard \| Sabotage \| Self-handicapping \| Teamwork

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M5 - Personnel Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041830