Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

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Year of publication:	2008-10-16
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Ploner, Matteo
Institutions:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Subject:	Strategic interaction \| Satisficing behavior \| Bounded rationality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Jena Economic Research Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2008-078
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090476