Screening equilibria in experimental markets
We conduct an experimental test of a screening model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We first conduct three sessions in which the proportion of high risk buyers is such that a separating equilibrium should exist. We then conduct three more sessions in which the only change we make is decreasing the proportion of high risks such that the equilibrium is now a pooling equilibrium. In both treatments, the observed behavior converges to the equilibrium prediction. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2007) 32, 147–167. doi:10.1007/s10713-007-0007-z
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Posey, Lisa L. ; Yavas, Abdullah |
Published in: |
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 1554-964X. - Vol. 32.2007, 2, p. 147-167
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
Saved in:
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