Sequential Bilateral Bargaining and the Shapley value

We extend Ilya Segal's work on bilateral contracting in the presence of externalities to the case of bilateral bargaining in the presence of externalities. Similarly to Segal's work, we prove our results for highly general settings, and provide examples of applications.

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Year of publication:	2004-08-11
Authors:	Fontenay, Catherine de ; Gans, Joshua
Institutions:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Bargaining \| Non-cooperative foundations of cooperative game theory

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Econometric Society Australasian Meetings 2004 Number 84
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702579