Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Gill, David ; Sgroi, Daniel
Published in:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 4.2004, 1
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Subject:	takeovers \| sequential \| pivotal

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	research-article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2202/1534-598X.1178 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589070