Shaping Inequality? Property Rights, Landed Elites and Public Lands in Colombia

How does the enforcement of property rights affects land accumulation by landed elites? Using a unique classification of the local agricultural workforce and a differencein- difference framework I show how landed elites, relative to landless peasants, benefited from Colombian land reform during the late 1930s through the appropriation of large land allocations. This is explained by a feature of the reform: lower enforcement of property rights, which reduced the costs of further accumulation. I provide evidence on the elite investments in de facto political power that drive this empowerment: competition for resources in local elections and collective action embodied in landowner associations. This, in a context of tension between good-intended progressive policies and a general process of collective action pushed forward by landowners toward the defense of property, in which commitments for targeted democratization of land were hardly accomplished. My findings shed light on a possible equilibrium between democracy and high inequality in which economic elites exploit institutional features empowering themselves to preserve certainty regarding their own property rights