Should Auctioneers Supply Early Information for Prospective Bidders?.

Consider an auction in which potential bidders must sink an entry investment before learning their values. Suppose the auction designer can make the bidders learn their value before entry. Such early information will induce screening of high-value bidders, and it will give rise to information rents and thereby a difference between the socially optimal auction and the auctioneer's preferred mechanism.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Vagstad, S.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	AUCTIONS \| INVESTMENTS \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	18 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647152