Simple complexity from imitation games

We give simple proofs of refinements of the complexity results of Gilboa and Zemel (1989), and we derive additional results of this sort. Our constructions employ imitation games, which are two person games in which both players have the same sets of pure strategies and the second player wishes to play the same pure strategy as the first player.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	McLennan, Andrew ; Tourky, Rabee
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 68.2010, 2, p. 683-688
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Imitation games Symmetric games Symmetric Nash equilibria Quadratic programming Stationary points Complexity NASH

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565476