Sind Nichtregierungsorganisationen die besseren Entwicklungshelfer?

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are widely expected to provide better targeted aid than state agencies with a hidden agenda of commercial and political self-interest. However, principal-agent models question that NGOs decide autonomously on aid allocation. Summarizing the results of four new empirical studies, we show that NGO aid indeed offers no panacea: The focus of NGOs on the neediest recipients turns out to be surprisingly weak. The striking similarities across these studies suggest that poor targeting is not limited to NGO aid of a particular type or from specific sources. NGOs hardly make use of the perceived comparative advantage of working in "difficult environments." Rather, they are strongly inclined to follow the herd of other NGOs and mimic the allocation behavior of state agencies, especially if they depend on public co-financing. Copyright 2009 die Autoren Journal compilation 2009, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.