SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	MARTIN, MATHIEU ; SALLES, MAURICE
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 15.2013, 03, p. 1340012-1
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Social choice \| aggregation functions \| voting games

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682650