Spanning network games

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the nucleolus.

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Year of publication:	1998-12-16
Authors:	Granot, Daniel ; Maschler, Michael
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 4, p. 467-500
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Games \| cooperative games \| networks \| core \| nucleolus \| decomposition \| minimum cost spanning tree games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received December 1994/Final version March 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598443