Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them - An Experimental Study

In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permit with the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given. Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one has additional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. (...)

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	González, Luis ; Güth, Werner ; Levati, Maria Vittoria
Publisher:	Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Bürokratie \| bureaucracy \| Experimentelle Spieltheorie \| Experimental Economics \| Bestechung \| Greasing

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Extent:	202752 bytes 21 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Abteilung für Strategische Interaktion - Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction ; 5 (2002)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Sociological and psychological aspects ; Public Management. Non-profit organisations ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

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