Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Abizada, Azar |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : Wiley, ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 735-756
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Subject: | Pairwise stability | budget constraint | strategy-proofness | Pareto-undominated | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | USA | United States | Bildungsfinanzierung | Education finance | Theorie | Theory | Budgetrestriktion | Budget constraint |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1731 [DOI] hdl:10419/150292 [Handle] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D44 - Auctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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