Stable matching : an integer programming approach

Chao Huang

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when the firms' preference profile satisfies a total unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy this condition.

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Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Huang, Chao
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 1, p. 37-63
Subject:	complementarity \| demand type \| integer programming \| many-to-one matching \| stability \| total unimodularity \| Two-sided matching \| Matching \| Ganzzahlige Optimierung \| Integer programming \| Mathematische Optimierung \| Mathematical programming \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Suchtheorie \| Search theory

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE4830 [DOI] hdl:10419/296404 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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