Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game

This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Ley, Eduardo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Induktive Statistik \| Statistical inference \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (9 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters
Classification:	C11 - Bayesian Analysis ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060040