Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Mumcu, Ayşe
Other Persons:	Sağlam, İsmail (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Matching \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Strategisches Management \| Strategic management

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 18, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3506016 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845795