Strategic mismatches in competing teams

Matthias Kräkel

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser's curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Kräkel, Matthias
Publisher:	Bonn : Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Subject:	Economies of scope \| free-rider effect \| mismatch \| teams \| tournament \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Free rider problem \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Theorie \| Theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

Extent:	Online-Ressource ([3], 25, [2] S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA. - Bonn : IZA, ISSN 2365-9793, ZDB-ID 2120053-1. - Vol. 74
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF-Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/20909 [Handle]
Classification:	J44 - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011313938