Strategic unemployment

Julia Angerhausen; Christian Bayer; Burkhard Hehenkamp

We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage. -- strategic unemployment ; asymmetric information ; wage bargaining ; minimum wage

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Angerhausen, Julia ; Bayer, Christian ; Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Publisher:	Dortmund : Univ., Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. Fak.
Subject:	Zufriedenheit \| Satisfaction \| Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment \| Erwerbstätigkeit \| Employment \| Atypische Beschäftigung \| Non-standard employment \| Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Beschäftigungsfähigkeit \| Employability \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (22 S.) graph. Darst.
Series:	Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge. - Dortmund : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2179681-6. - Vol. 06,02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/39439 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892041