Strategic unemployment

We propose a dynamic model that explains why individuals may be reluctant to pick up work although the wage is above their reservation wage. Accepting low paid work will put them in an adverse position in future wage bargaining, as employers could infer the individual's low reservation wage from his working history. Employers will exploit their knowledge offering low wages to this individual unemployment to signal a high reservation wage.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Angerhausen, Julia ; Bayer, Christian ; Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Publisher:	Dortmund : Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	strategic unemployment \| asymmetric information \| wage bargaining \| minimum wage

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Series:	Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge ; 06-02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	612025799 [GVK] hdl:10419/39439 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270835