Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object

We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Hashimoto, Kazuhiko
Other Persons:	Nakayama, Yu (contributor)
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Insolvenz \| Insolvency \| Theorie \| Theory \| Unteilbare Güter \| Indivisible goods \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
Series:	ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 961
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 29, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2740896 [DOI]
Classification:	d47 ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997704