Structural remedies as a signalling device

Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey

We analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity in a Cournot oligopoly when the Antitrust Agency (AA) cannot observe a proposed merger's efficiency type. Provided the AA follows a consumer surplus standard, an efficient merger type is doomed to over-fix with its divestiture proposal in a pooling equilibrium, which is also possible under separation.

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Year of publication:	January 2016
Authors:	Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus ; Wey, Christian
Publisher:	Düsseldorf, Germany : dup, düsseldorf university press
Subject:	Remedies \| Divestiture \| Merger Control \| Signalling \| Fusionskontrolle \| Merger control \| Theorie \| Theory \| Entflechtung \| Unbundling \| Fusion \| Merger \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (13 Seiten)
Series:	DICE discussion paper. - Düsseldorf, Germany : düsseldorf university press, ISSN 2190-9938, ZDB-ID 2578649-0. - Vol. no 209
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86304-208-0
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/125930 [Handle]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414129