Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Sandholm, William H. ; Hofbauer, Josef |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 6.2011, 3, p. 341-377
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Evolutionary game theory | evolutionary game dynamics | nonconvergnece | dominated strategies |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE771 [DOI] 894767844 [GVK] hdl:10419/150158 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:771 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
Sandholm, William H., (2011)
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Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
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