Synchronized matching with incomplete information
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Johnson, Terence |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 67.2019, 3, p. 589-616
|
Subject: | Matching | Mechanism design | Non-transferable Utility | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
-
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Pereyra, Juan, (2020)
-
Everyone likes to be liked : experimental evidence from matching markets
Opitz, Timm, (2023)
-
Reciprocal preferences in matching markets
Opitz, Timm, (2023)
- More ...
-
Matching Through Position Auctions
Johnson, Terence, (2009)
-
Cash transfers as a response to COVID-19: A randomized experiment in Kenya
Brooks, Wyatt, (2021)
-
Is there a cost-effective means of training microenterprises?
Brooks, Wyatt, (2020)
- More ...